In Egypt, Islamist runs against the odds

In Egypt, Islamist runs against the odds
A harassed lawyer belonging to the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood
conducts a shadow campaign for a village council seat.
By Jeffrey Fleishman
Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
April 4, 2008
http://www.latimes. com/news/ nationworld/ world/la- fg-
lockout4apr04, 0,6600009. story

QATTAWEYA, EGYPT — He has been jailed, his computer has been seized,
his blog is tracked by intelligence officials, and Mohammed Shawkat
Malt concedes that his latest political quest appears doomed.

A gregarious lawyer in a pale suit, Malt, a member of the outlawed
Muslim Brotherhood, has filed court appeals to get his name on the
ballot for Tuesday's municipal elections. The government has ignored
him, and Malt runs an unofficial shadow campaign with no chance of
winning a seat on the council representing this farming village in
the Nile Delta.

"I just want to say I'm present. I'm here. I won't lose hope," said
Malt, 50.

Malt and other Muslim Brotherhood candidates across the nation have
been barred by local election boards. It is an aggressive tactic by
the ruling National Democratic Party, or NDP, to weaken the broad
support of the Islamist organization, which represents the most
significant opposition to President Hosni Mubarak at a time of
widening discord over bread lines and inflation.

In recent weeks, more than 1,000 political activists and opposition
figures, most of them belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood, have been
either arrested or detained. The group claims that only 498 of the
5,754 candidates it fielded were certified by election boards. The
result: The NDP is expected to win 90% of 52,000 seats on councils
representing villages, towns and cities.

Human rights groups have criticized Egypt for erecting a facade of
democracy that is supported by about $2 billion in annual U.S. aid.
The Bush administration said it was "concerned" about the arrests,
but it was advised by NDP officials to not interfere in Egypt's
domestic affairs.

"We lost the hope of having free and fair elections in Egypt," said
Mustafa Kamel Sayed, a political science professor at Cairo
University. "This time all indications point to an election that
offers people very little choice."

The Mubarak government has been attempting throughout its more than
26 years in power to marginalize the Islamist organization. The
Muslim Brotherhood supports the militant group Hamas in the Gaza
Strip and believes Egypt should be ruled by Islam's Sharia law. It
has renounced violence at home. Its community services, which have
highlighted government failings in healthcare and education, receive
praise from the middle and educated classes.

"The Muslim Brotherhood did not seek to run for municipal elections
as much as they wanted to become newsmakers and play the victim's
role," said Abdullah Kamal, the editor of Rose al Youssef magazine
(rosaonline. net) and a staunch proponent of Mubarak's regime. "This
group is based on religious foundations; it embraces ideas that
foment terrorism, sectarianism and oppose Egyptian civility."

These are tense political times in Egypt. Privatization and reform
have led to economic growth but also to high inflation and
unemployment. Labor unrest is growing and there is anxiety over who
will succeed the frail, 79-year-old Mubarak. The secular opposition
is in disarray and the Muslim Brotherhood is battling internal
divisions between moderates and conservatives that suggest
inconsistency and poor leadership.

Banned as a political party, the Islamist organization ran
candidates as independents in 2005 and won 20% of the seats in the
current parliament. The government has since tightened laws to keep
the group from making further political gains. Mubarak is concerned
that the religious revival across Egypt may embolden radicals and
threaten the more secular-minded NDP.

In this village of dirt roads and mud-brick walls, where egrets and
donkeys linger in the tall grass of the Delta, Malt is not
contemplating ideology so much as the cleaning up of a corrupt
municipal council controlled by the NDP. The municipality has been
criticized by prosecutors for illicit dealings, including kickbacks
from home builders and developers.

"We want to get rid of the negligence, nepotism and bribes," said
Malt, whose blog is called the Awaited Hope. "Our country does not
belong to the NDP. Egyptians don't deserve what we are getting now.
We're backward on so many fronts and we're going downhill."

The village has been an Islamist stronghold for decades. Malt's
father, uncles and other relatives in the Muslim Brotherhood have
spent years in prison. Malt spent 45 days in jail last year for
belonging to an illegal organization. His son Sohaib, 23, a medical
student at Al Azhar University in Cairo, was jailed a year earlier
for leading an anti-government protest at the school.

Malt does not keep secret his belief that Islam and politics should
be one. The graffiti on a wall in front of his home reads: "The veil
is your way to heaven." He blames Washington for siding with the
Egyptian regime and says the Muslim Brotherhood is portrayed as
fanatical "because the Western media are controlled by Jews."

Malt had a political voice in the 1990s. He was a member of the
municipal council, but it was disbanded by the state to counter the
growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. When he attempted to
register his candidacy several weeks ago, Malt said, he was met by
plainclothes policemen who detained him for hours and prevented him
from filing election papers.

As he spoke in a living room of bare concrete walls and blue and
yellow carpets, security forces in other Delta provinces were firing
rubber bullets to break up protests by hundreds of his fellow
Islamists.

"God willing, the Muslim Brotherhood will come to power one day,"
Malt said. "If my generation doesn't make it, the next one will."

jeffrey.fleishman

@latimes.com

Noha El-Hennawy of The Times' Cairo Bureau contributed to this
report.

Bloody day in Somalia leaves 19 dead as Islamists press government
forces
By Agence France Presse (AFP)
Friday, April 04, 2008
http://www.dailysta r.com.lb/ article.asp?
edition_id=10& categ_id= 2&article_ id=90611

MOGADISHU: At least 19 Somalis, including 15 soldiers, were killed
and several wounded Thursday in separate clashes between Islamist
insurgents and security forces, officials and witnesses said. The
Islamist fighters attacked a military camp near the town of Addado,
500 kilometers north of the capital Mogadishu, killing 15 soldiers
and wounded 20 others.

"The fighting was very heavy. Shebaab fighters attacked our military
base outside Addado and we lost 15 men and six vehicles," Dahir
Shidane, an army commander, told AFP.

"I don't know the casualties on the other side," he added.

Several witnesses said government soldiers lost the fighting, the
latest in the nation of 9 million, which is increasingly running
adrift in the face of a relentless insurgency.

"Many people were killed in the fighting, I couldn't count the dead
bodies in the battle field," said resident Abdiwahab Haji Dahir.

Separately, insurgents attacked a Somali governor in southwestern
region and killed two policemen and two civilians, witnesses said.

The attack occurred in Qasahdere, 335 kilometers southwest of
Mogadishu, where Bay region Governor Abdufatah Mohammad Ibrahim and
other government officials were lodged in a hotel. Contacted by AFP,
the governor said the attack on his delegation took place at about
4:00 a.m., but he was unhurt.

Islamist fighters this week seized control of the central town of
Buulo Burte, days after they briefly took control of the town of
Jowhar, leaving a trail of fatalities.

Over the past year, the insurgents have attacked government targets
after being ousted from the southern and central regions by
Ethiopian-backed Somali troops early 2007. The fighting has killed
thousands and forced hundreds of thousands to flee mainly from
Mogadishu, which has been the epicenter of the clashes.


Somali Premier Hassan Hussein Nur has adopted a more inclusive
approach to the national reconciliation process than his predecessor
Ali Mohammad Gedi, who was forced to quit last year.

And Somalia's exiled Islamist leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad on
Wednesday pledged his camp's commitment to a new peace drive but
warned the movement would keep up its struggle against what it calls
Ethiopian occupation.

Somalia has lacked an effective government since the 1991 ouster of
dictator Mohammad Siad Barre paved the way for factional clashes
that have defied several bids to restore stability.

l NAIROBI: Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF - Doctors Without Borders)
said Thursday it had closed operations in the southern Somali town
of Kismayo following the January killing of three staff members.

Although activities in Kismayo, about 500 kilometers south of the
capital, Mogadishu, have ended, the medical charity said it remained
committed to providing medical care in other parts of the restive
country.

"This has been an extremely difficult decision to make," said Arjan
Hehenkamp, MSF's director of operations for Somalia. "There is a
significant need for independent humanitarian [aid] in Kismayo, but
we cannot continue working in a place where our staff has been
deliberately targeted and brutally murdered."

A Kenyan doctor, a French logistics expert and a Somali driver with
the aid group were killed along with a local journalist by a
roadside bomb in southwest Somalia on January 28 in Kismayo.

A number of top international aid agencies - including Oxfam, World
Vision and Save the Children - said last month in a joint statement
that the Horn of Africa country had become too dangerous for its
workers.

Two aid workers employed by a subcontractor on a Food and
Agriculture Organization project north of Kismayo - a Briton and
Kenyan - were abducted by gunmen Tuesday. - AFP
Thursday, April 03, 2008
Media silent on US air strikes in sealed-off Sadr City
http://arablinks. blogspot. com/2008/ 04/media- silent-on- us-air-strikes- in.html

Xinhuanet filed this on its Arabic-language website Wednesday evening (April 2), along with reports of other Baghdad violence:
Sources said a fire broke out in a residential apartment building in Sadr City, eastern Baghdad, the result of an American bombing. The extent of damage is unknown, given the fact that Iraqi police barred entry to the aforementioned region, which has been under curfew for a number of days.

The Xinhua person apparently tried to get to the site, and reports that everyone was barred by Iraqi police. Compare McClatchy's one sentence (in its dispatch to its Washington office): "At dawn, the American planes bombed some targets in Sadr City, police said." And the "Multinational Force Iraq" website: Zero Other corporate media: Zero

Putting the reports and non-reports together: Sadr City targets, in the plural, were bombed by the Americans; Xinhua heard about one of these because of the fire; tried to get to the site and reports that everyone was barred. Naturally, US bombings of a residential area that is in effect quarantined are a major story, right? Not at all, not a word, not a whisper, in the US media.

It has been widely reported that the US authorities think at least some of the rocket/mortar attacks on the Green Zone have been coming from the vicinity of the Green Zone. Could yesterday's bombings in Sadr City have anything to do with that other big story about increasing accuracy in rocket and mortar attacks on the Green Zone, thought to be coming from Sadr City?

(People unavoidably think in terms of images and already-experienced patters. Would it not be a good idea for those thinking of the Green Zone attacks as leading to a helicopters- on-the-roof experience, to think instead about the Israel-Fatah- Hamas pattern in this GreenZone-Maliki- Sadr situation, resistance leading to quarantines, media blackouts, and the other accoutrements of collective punishment?)
posted by badger at 7:01 AM

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Friday, April 04, 2008
Clashes Continue in Basra: Badr Militia Strengthened
http://www.juancole .com/2008/ 04/clashes- continue- in-basra- badr-militia. html

Al-Hayat reports in Arabic that clashes continued to be fought in Basra on Thursday between Iraqi government troops and the Mahdi Army militia.

It also says that US troops in civilian clothing were targeted in the Shiite city of Hillah south of Baghdad. They were attacked by unknown gunmen and had to call in airstrikes on enemy positions. So how come they were wearing civilian cloths?

The same report discussed the arrest of Yusuf Sanawi, leader of Tha'r Allah (the revenge of God), which stands accused of being behind much of the violence in Basra.

The LAT says Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is intent on pursuing his struggle with the Mahdi Army militia, not only in the southern port city of Basra but in other Shiite cities as well. Apparently he thinks big talk will substitute for successful military operations.

In response, Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Mahdi Army, called for demonstrations on Friday and then for a million-man march on April 9, the anniversary of the US occupation of Baghdad and the fall of the Baath government. (Sadr is happy about the fall of Saddam; unhappy about the foreign military occupation).

Al-Zaman reports in Arabic that Iran and Kuwait have closed their borders with Iraq and halted the import-export trade because of the deterioration of security.

The New York Times confirms that "over a thousand" officers and troops of the Iraqi army declined to fight the Mahdi Army in Basra or deserted their posts. It also reports that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki replaced them by inducting 10,000 Shiite "tribal" fighters into the Iraqi army. But the Iraqi press didn't call them "tribal," it called them Badr Corps, the paramilitary of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, headed by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and now al-Maliki's main political ally. I'm not sure about the source of the discrepancy, but the NYT piece seems to be based on interviews with Iraqi and American government officials. It is possible that the need to strengthen the Iraqi army by turning to a Shiite militia trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (terrorists! ) was just too embarrassing to admit. So the officials used the euphemism "tribal forces" with the foreign press.

Fred Kaplan at Slate http://www.slate. com/id/2188161/
asks the good question of whether the induction of the Badr fighters into the army means that the Iraqi government is increasingly dependent on that militia. I think the answer is clearly yes. Indeed, the only effective fighters the Iraqi military has appear to be Badr Corps and Kurdish Peshmerga. (Apparently the Kurdish troops declined to go all the way down south to Basra, and the 14th Division that did go down is made up of southern Shiites, many of them with Sadrist sympathies.)

For the Iraqi government to depend on Badr and Peshmerga militias, however, weakens its independence and makes it hostage to allies of Iran (both Jalal Talabani, the president of Iraq and a Kurdish leader, and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, have close relations with the Iranian ayatollahs.) So not only did Iran gain stature and authority in Iraq by negotiating a (fragile) ceasefire between al-Maliki and Muqtada al-Sadr, but al-Maliki has is now more than ever dependent on Iranian clients.

Wayne White of the Middle East Institute
http://www.mideasti .org/commentary/ iraq-dark- shadows-things- come
makes the interesting observation that the Mahdi Army became stronger in Basra because of the US troop escalation in Baghdad. Many fighters, seeking to wait out the surge, relocated to Basra, where their strength surprised al-Maliki

Jonathan Steele
http://www.guardian .co.uk/commentis free/2008/ apr/04/usa. iraq
argues that al-Sadr came out of the episode much strengthened. He suggests that Cheney may have greenlighted the operation when he was there, in hopes that it would produce dramatic good news in time for the upcoming Petraeus / Crocker appearances before Congress. If so, it backfired big time.

[...]
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In Iraq, Maliki warns of more offensives
After the Basra standoff, the Iraqi prime minister speaks harshly of Muqtada Sadr's followers.
By Ned Parker and Caesar Ahmed
Los Angeles Times Staff Writers
April 4, 2008
http://www.latimes. com/news/ nationworld/ world/la- fg-iraq4apr04, 1,676395. story

BAGHDAD — Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki vowed Thursday after last week's battle in the southern port of Basra to carry out more offensives around Iraq, mentioning as targets neighborhoods in Baghdad associated with Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada Sadr's Mahdi Army militia.

Maliki once more drew attention to the divide between himself and Sadr, a former ally whose militia clashed with Iraqi forces for six days last week in Basra. The standoff ended when the cleric told his followers to put down their weapons.

"Basra was a prisoner. Now it's liberated and its people are in joy. I understand there are other cities that need similar operations. There are also some neighborhoods in Baghdad where theirpeople are still hostages in the hands of these criminals ruling them," Maliki told reporters. "We will not leave our people and families in Sadr City, Shula, Amiriya and other places."

The Shula neighborhood and the Sadr City district of Baghdad are bastions of support for Sadr that U.S. and Iraqi forces were unable to penetrate in last week's fighting.

Amiriya is a Sunni neighborhood, home to a Sunni paramilitary group that aligned with the U.S. military last summer to battle Al Qaeda in Iraq. The Shiite-led government doubts the loyalty of some of the Sunni fighters there.

Maliki flew to Basra last week and supervised the campaign, in which security units raided residential neighborhoods in the name of driving out criminal gangs and restoring law and order. Mahdi Army forces rose up against the police and army incursion, in part because they saw the operation as an attempt to weaken the cleric's movement before provincial elections expected in October.

The prime minister had harsh words for Sadr's followers.

"If they want to be partners in the political process, they should comply with the democratic process and its mechanisms for taking their rights. But for one to be above the law, a power besides the government, an army besides an army, they are deceived if they think they can go on like this," he said.

Maliki acknowledged that the military had made some "miscalculations" in Basra.

The Sadr movement, meanwhile, is planning what it hopes will be a million-strong demonstration against the American presence in Iraq on Wednesday in the holy city of Najaf, to mark the fifth anniversary of the fall of Baghdad to U.S. forces.

At a news conference, lawmaker Baha Araji, with the Sadr bloc, warned Maliki to back down.

"We are calling the political blocs, especially the United Iraqi Alliance, to advise the prime minister to return to his sanity and his Iraqi background and not to go with his partisan fanaticism and international agenda," Araji told reporters. The United Iraqi Alliance is the main Shiite bloc in parliament, of which Maliki's party is a member.

Meanwhile, a U.S. airman died Thursday in a roadside bombing while on patrol in central Baghdad, the U.S. military said in a statement. The killing brings the number of U.S. soldiers who have died since the March 2003 invasion to at least 4,013, according to the website icasualties. org.

In Basra, there were contradictory reports about an airstrike Wednesday that left as many as three people dead.

The U.S. military said the attack killed two suspects after Iraqi and U.S.-led coalition forces came under fire from a house in the Basra suburb of Qibla. Iraqi witnesses said three civilians were killed in the strike.

ned.parker@latimes. com

Times staff writers Raheem Salman and Saif Rasheed contributed to this report.

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Green Zone Defeat? 'Handed Over' to a Government Called Sadr
Occupation forces no longer control the Green Zone
by Ali al-Fadhily and Dahr Jamail
Global Research, April 2, 2008
Inter Press Service
http://www.globalre search.ca/ index.php? context=va& aid=8535

BAGHDAD, Apr 2 (IPS) - Despite the huge media campaign led by U.S. officials and a complicit corporate-controlle d media to convince the world of U.S. success in Iraq, emerging facts on the ground show massive failure.

The date March 25 of this year will be remembered as the day of truth through five years of occupation.

"Mehdi army militias controlled all Shia and mixed parts of Baghdad in no time," a Baghdad police colonel, speaking on condition of anonymity, told IPS. "Iraqi army and police forces as well as Badr and Dawa militias suddenly disappeared from the streets, leaving their armoured vehicles for Mehdi militiamen to drive around in joyful convoys that toured many parts of Baghdad before taking them to their stronghold of Sadr City in the east of Baghdad."

The police colonel was speaking of the recent clashes between members of the Shia Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army, the largest militia in the country, and members of the Iraqi government forces, that are widely known to comprise members of a rival Shia militia, the Badr Organisation.

Dozens of militiamen from both sides were killed in clashes that broke out in Baghdad, Basra, Kut, Samawa, Hilla and most of the Iraqi Shia southern provinces between the Mehdi Army and other militias supported by the U.S., Iran and the Iraqi government.

The Badr Organisation militia is headed by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who is also head of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) that dominates the government. The Dawa Party is headed by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

The number of civilians killed and injured in the clashes is still unknown. Iraqi government offices continue to keep largely silent about the events.

"Every resident of Basra knew the situation would explode any minute between these oil thieves, and that Basra would suffer another wave of militia war," Salman Kathum, a doctor and former resident of Basra who fled for Baghdad last month told IPS.

For months now there has been a struggle between the Sadr Movement, the SIIC, and the al-Fadhila Party for control of the south, and particularly Basra.

Falah Shenshal, an MP allied to al-Sadr, told al-Jazeera Mar. 26 that al-Maliki was targeting political opponents. "They say they target outlaw gangs, but why do they start with the areas where the sons of the Sadr movement are located? This is a political battle...for the political interests of one party (al-Maliki's Dawa party) because the local elections are coming soon (due later this year)."

The fighting came just as the U.S. military announced the death of their 4,000th soldier in Iraq, and on the heels of a carefully crafted PR campaign designed to show that the "surge" of U.S. troops in Iraq has successfully improved the situation on the ground.

"I wonder what lies General David Petraeus (the U.S. forces commander in Iraq) will fabricate this time," Malek Shakir, a journalist in Baghdad told IPS. "The 25th March events revealed the true failure of the U.S. occupation project in Iraq. More complications are expected in the coming days."

Maliki has himself been in Basra to lead a surge against Mehdi Army militias while the U.S. sent forces to surround Sadr City in an attempt to support their Badr and Dawa allies.

News of limited clashes and air strikes have come from Sadr City, with unofficial reports of many casualties amongst civilians. Curfew in many parts of Baghdad and in four southern provinces had made life difficult already.

"This failure takes Iraq to point zero and even worse," Brigadier-General Kathum Alwan of the Iraqi army told IPS in Baghdad. "We must admit that the formation of our forces was wrong, as we saw how our officers deserted their posts, leaving their vehicles for militias."

Alwan added, "Not a single unit of our army and police stood for their duty in Baghdad, leaving us wondering what to do. Most of the officers who left their posts were members of Badr brigades and the Dawa Party, who should have been most faithful to Maliki's government."

The Green Zone of Baghdad where the U.S. embassy and the Iraqi government and parliament buildings are located, was hit by missiles. General Petraeus appeared at a press conference to accuse Iran of being behind the shelling of the zone that is supposed to be the safest area in Iraq. At least one U.S. citizen was killed in the attacks, and two others were injured.

"The Green Zone looked deserted as most U.S. and Iraqi personnel were ordered to take shelter deep underground, " an engineer who works for a foreign company in the zone told IPS. "It seemed that this area too was under curfew. No place in Iraq is safe any more."

Further complicating matters for the occupiers of Iraq, the U.S.-backed Awakening groups, largely comprised of former resistance fighters, are now going on strike to demand overdue payment from the U.S. military.

Ali, IPS correspondent in Baghdad, works in close collaboration with Dahr Jamail, our U.S.-based specialist writer on Iraq who has reported extensively from Iraq and the Middle East

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Al-Maliki halts security raids as suicide bomber kills 15 north of Baghdad
04/04/2008
http://aawsat. com/english/ news.asp? section=1& id=12303

BAGHDAD (AP) - Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on Friday ordered a nationwide freeze on raids against suspected Shiite militants after the leader of the biggest militia complained that arrests of his followers were continuing despite his order to pull his fighters off the streets.

Also Friday, a suicide bomber killed at least 15 people and wounded eight when he blew himself up during a funeral for a policeman north of Baghdad, officials said. Such attacks are the hallmark of Sunni religious extremists.

Al-Maliki's statement did not give a timeframe for the freeze nor refer to the Mahdi Army of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The statement said only that the freeze was designed to give a chance to "those who repented and want to lay down their arms."

"Those who lay down their arms and participated in the recent acts of violence will not be prosecuted," the statement said.

On Thursday, the prime minister said he intended to launch security operations militants in two Baghdad neighborhoods where the Mahdi militia operates, including its Sadr City stronghold. Many residents of Shiite neighborhoods stocked up on food and other supplies after al-Maliki's statement.

The suicide attack occurred in Sadiyah, a town 95 kilometers (60 miles) north of Baghdad in the volatile Diyala province, where U.S. and Iraqi forces are still battling Sunni extremists of al-Qaeda. Police said the bomber mingled among the mourners and then triggered an explosive vest.

The Shiite-led government launched a crackdown March 25 against Shiite extremists in the southern city of Basra, triggering fierce resistance that included rocket and mortar attacks against the U.S.-controlled Green Zone in Baghdad.

Fighting eased after al-Sadr called Sunday on his militia to stop fighting. But al-Sadr has complained that government forces are still conducting raids and arrests against his followers.

A U.S. military statement on Friday said that during the operation Iraqi special forces had captured a suspected militant leader who has been rallying insurgents in Basra to fight against coalition forces.

The statement said the suspect was linked the kidnapping and murder of Iraqi security troopers and had been involved in oil smuggling "and foreign fighter networks." No further details were released. The government has given Shiite militiamen until Tuesday to hand in heavy weapons, but it was unclear if the freeze was tied to that date.

Despite a drop in fighting, Iraqi officials insist that the Basra crackdown will continue until it breaks the stronghold that armed groups have had on the city since 2005. Maj. Tom Holloway, a British military spokesman, said a roadside bomb targeted a British force "supporting an Iraqi-led operation at the very fringes of Basra." He said the British were "mentoring and monitoring" the Iraqi operation, but provided no further details.

The action came a day after Iraqi troops killed seven militants and detained 16 in three separate incidents in the same general area.

In a separate firefight, a coalition warplane was used to bomb insurgents engaging Iraqi special forces in the city. The air strike killed two militants, the U.S. statement said.

Iraqi officials have insisted the crackdown is against criminal gangs and not al-Sadr's political movement. Elsewhere, a roadside bomb early Friday killed four policeman and wounded one in Hillah, a town about 95 kilometers (60 miles) south of Baghdad, a police spokesman said.

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Iraq: Dark Shadows of Things to Come
April 03, 2008
Wayne White
http://www.mideasti .org/commentary/ iraq-dark- shadows-things- come

The Nuri al Maliki government’s failure to defeat Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Basra is yet another indication that beneath the widely acclaimed “success” of the surge is a country largely bereft of the legitimate governance required for genuine stability. Iran’s intermediary role between Maliki and Sadr suggests that what passes for an Iraqi central government is, in fact, little more than another actor on an Iraqi political scene still badly fragmented along factional lines.

At the conclusion of Prime Minister Maliki’s determined effort to wrest control of much of Basra from Sadr’s fighters, Sadr’s people reportedly controlled even more of the city than before. The government has lost face, Sadr’s standing has been considerably enhanced, and his defiance of the government, which he labeled a “Satan” in an interview with al-Jazeera, is unshaken. Past US and Iraqi government efforts to wear down Sadr’s forces with scattered attacks and arrests clearly have had little impact. Indeed, a Mahdi Army commander in Baghdad bragged last week: “We can take on anyone now.”

The popular appeal of the brash, anti-American and nationalistic young cleric among vast numbers of downtrodden Shi’a has been powerful. It may now exceed that of other more established movements such as that of leading rival Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).

Although little-discussed, this episode also undermines the myth of the successful surge. Sadr’s Mahdi Army was not especially strong in Basra until the surge into Baghdad in early 2007 caused thousands of Sadr’s fighters to redeploy to southern Iraq, effectively out of reach of US forces, in order to wait out the surge. This major reverse for the Iraqi central government is partly an adverse consequence of the surge.

Meanwhile, Maliki’s government continues to drag its feet in allowing tens of thousands of Sunni Arab Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) cadres to be incorporated into the Iraqi security forces. This comes as no surprise since the CLC’s, the result of the so-called Sunni Arab “Awakening,” are made up largely of former insurgents and other Sunni Arab tribal elements who harbor considerable hostility and mistrust toward the Shi’a-dominated government.

Maliki and other key government figures strongly opposed the US decision to allow the CLC’s and other local Sunni Arab groups to arm and organize themselves in the first place. Such elements had begun asking for an alliance of convenience between themselves and US forces (but not the Iraqi government) since 2004 in order to move against abusive al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) elements in their midst. The U.S. only agreed to this dicey arrangement in late 2006 amidst the awful sectarian strife of that year: violence driven by AQI’s bombardment of suicide bombings.

Ever since, the Administration has done quite well in convincing many that the Awakening is a surge-related success story, even though the vast majority of U.S. troops involved in the surge were sent to Baghdad, not to areas where the CLC’s have been active. The deal with the CLC’s, not the surge, stabilized large predominantly Sunni Arab areas, cut U.S. casualties, delt severe blows to AQI, and reduced suicide bombings hammering the Iraqi capital. This cooperation, however, is uncertain over the long-term in the face of profound government mistrust.

The Administration has gone so far as to characterize this hasty improvisation in the midst of crisis as a new “bottom-up” strategy for bringing stabilization to much of Iraq. However, in the continued absence of meaningful reconciliation between Shi’a and Sunni Arabs, the CLC’s are, in reality, a robust collection of potentially very dangerous Sunni Arab militias now numbering nearly 100,000. And they are fast losing faith that the government will ever accept them. There is great risk that the CLC’s could turn on the government at some point down the line, one reason Gen. Petraeus recently characterized the situation on the ground as still “tenuous.”

Limited as they are to largely Sunni Arab portions of the country, the CLC’s hardly represent a new approach to stable governance. In fact, the only reason they have been described in such terms is out of frustration with the dysfunctional, sectarian and corrupt performance of the Iraqi central government.

The government’s lack of authority in most areas of Iraq has reduced it, especially in the context of its botched effort to bring the Mahdi Army to heel, to little more than another major party competing for power on an Iraqi political scene dominated otherwise by the Kurdish Regional Government and its armed Peshmerga in the far north, armed Sunni Arab elements in north central Iraq, and various Shia militias in Baghdad and much of the south. That was illustrated when the Iranians had to mediate between Maliki and Sadr, strongly suggesting that only they had sufficient influence with Sadr to broker a ceasefire.

Both the U.S. government and military have failed to recognize in recent years that the one major Iraqi government institution upon which Americans have pinned so much hope—the Iraqi Army—also is deeply divided by various conflicting factional loyalties. The lackluster performance of the army (and other Iraqi security forces, such as the long-troubled police) against the Mahdi Army (as well as desertions to Sadr’s side during the fighting) revealed that many soldiers feel more loyalty toward Shi’a parties and their militias than the central government. This should come as no surprise given the Baghdad’s poor performance on a variety of issues since a fully sovereign government was established back in 2005.

This Administration— as well as the next—may find itself increasingly in a quandary. As the U.S. continues to withdraw additional troops, there could be a rebound in violence in various forms. With most Iraqi loyalties factional, U.S. troops in many ways represent the only relatively neutral party separating potentially hostile elements. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Gen. Petraeus has asked that withdrawals be halted in July when the downsizing to pre-surge levels has been completed. Nonetheless, there is little reason to believe that simply “sitting on” or separating various factions for a long time to come would bring genuine stability.

Wayne White is an Adjunct Scholar with the Middle East Institute. Previously he served as Deputy Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the Near East, with a special focus on Iraq.

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Apr 5, 2008
Muqtada out of step in Shi'ite dance
By Sami Moubayed
http://www.atimes. com/atimes/ Middle_East/ JD05Ak02. html

DAMASCUS - Two years ago, Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr was interviewed by La Republica, explaining his relationship with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Then, the two men were firmly allied in a friendship that was frowned on by almost everybody; the Americans, the Iranians, Arab states and Iraqi Sunnis. Muqtada's supporters were critical, claiming that by working with Maliki, their boss was legitimizing a US-backed prime minister.

Maliki's supporters were equally uneasy, claiming that Muqtada was an embarrassment and that they would never be taken seriously as statesmen, or be accepted by the regional neighborhood, as long as they relied on protection from Muqtada's militia, the Mahdi Army.

Maliki and Muqtada, however, thought otherwise. Maliki needed
Muqtada to win the hearts of grassroot Iraqis. Muqtada was popular among poor and young people, especially in the slums of Baghdad, where Maliki had virtually no powerbase. Muqtada had religious legitimacy, given the influence and standing of his father and family in the Iraqi Shi'ite community.

Maliki had none of that and needed a face-lift, having just been elected prime minister after many years of obscure service in the underground against Saddam Hussein. Nobody really knew him in Baghdad as he had spent most of the Saddam years as a refugee in Syria. Muqtada on the other hand needed protection from the American dragnet. The relationship was: "You protect me from US persecution, I legitimize you in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis."

The price for this marriage of convenience was having to tolerate the Sadrists in government, where they were given six important portfolios and 30 seats in the Iraqi parliament - meaning they had a paramount say in Iraqi decision-making and their militia, the Mahdi Army, would be preserved and protected.

Maliki lived up to this promise, going to great length at times - often at the expense of his own reputation - to talk the Americans out of raiding Sadr City. The George W Bush administration realized that in as much as it wanted to punish Muqtada for all the violence it blamed on him it nevertheless needed him on the safe side to prevent him from repeating violence which he had on occasions unleashed.

By bringing him into the political process and giving him money, authority and responsibility, the Americans thought they could clip his wings and pacify him, while simultaneously upholding the Maliki regime.

Trying to downplay all of that when speaking to the Italian daily, Muqtada said: "Between myself and Abu Israa [an alternate name for Maliki] there has never been much feeling. I have always suspected that he was being maneuvered, and I have never trusted him. We have met only on a couple of occasions. At our last meeting, he first told me: 'You are the country's backbone,' and then he confessed that he was 'obliged' to combat us. Obliged, you hear me?"

Nobody believed the young cleric, suspecting this was talk targeting the Western media. Had Maliki truly not trusted Muqtada, he would not have given him government office and prevented the US from cracking down on the Mahdi Army in 2006-2007. Had Muqtada truly believed that Maliki was being "maneuvered" by the Americans, he would not have legitimized him by taking part in his government, thereby effectively legitimizing the political process of post-2003 Iraq.

The Sadrists were treating government agencies like their own back yard, investing heavily in the Ministry of Education, for example, to indoctrinate young Iraqis with Sadrist propaganda. They used the Ministry of Health to provide services, medication and hospitalization - frequently for free - to poverty-stricken Iraqis, making them loyal supporters of the Mahdi Army.

Those Shi'ites who could not find jobs were given impressive salaries in the Mahdi Army - along with a gun and a license of kill. They created death squads at night and roamed Iraq's cities, targeting traditional enemies, mainly Sunnis, with no one to hold them accountable.

The relationship soured in December 2006 when Maliki refused to argue for a timetable for US troop withdrawal during his Amman meeting with Bush. Muqtada was equally disturbed by Maliki's alliance with the Kurds and his willingness to help them annex the oil-rich Kirkuk area to Iraqi Kurdistan, as a means of endearing himself to a powerful constituency in the Iraqi street, that had excellent relations with the Americans.

Muqtada wanted to uphold Iraq's Arab identity. That was not even on the agenda of the prime minister, him being more of a Shi'ite nationalist than an Iraqi one. Muqtada was opposed to the carving up of Iraq and the creation of an autonomous district for Shi'ites in the south. He was also opposed to too much emphasis being placed on Iran. He aimed at creating a Shi'ite theocracy in Iraq, based on the Iranian model, but nevertheless wanted it to remain independent of the mullahs of Tehran.

Maliki on the other hand was cozying up to the Iranians. At one point, Muqtada withdrew his ministers from government, then froze the activity of his 30 deputies, effectively crippling the Maliki administration. He wanted Maliki to come back on hands and knees, begging him to reconsider. The premier saw this walkout as a blessing in disguise. Glad to see the end of the young rebel, he thanked him for his services and immediately snuggled up to the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), headed by Muqtada's rival in the Shi'ite community, the pro-Iranian and yet pro-American cleric, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim.

The Arab world had been haranguing the prime minister for his ties to Muqtada, especially after the Sadrists executed Saddam in December 2006. In black ski-masks, they chanted "Muqtada! Muqtada!" at the execution scene, looking more like gangsters than Iraqi officials carrying out a legal verdict passed by the Iraqi courts.

This enflamed Sunni emotions throughout the Arab world, who blamed Maliki for creating a Frankenstein out of Muqtada - one that could no longer be controlled. Maliki snubbed Muqtada, consolidated his ties to Hakim, and opened channels with the Iraqi Accordance Front (a Sunni coalition) and the Kurds. He began to brandish himself as an Iraqi nationalist, rather than a Shi'ite one, visiting Arab heavyweights like Syria and Saudi Arabia to cement ties with Arab officialdom.

Today, the two sides engage in combat that quiet unintentionally crowns Muqtada as Shi'ite king in Iraq, greatly damaging the reputation of the prime minister. Scores of Iraqi troops have laid down their arms after one week of combat and simply refused to open fire against the Sadrists. Many have mutinied and joined the Mahdi Army. Some are saying that instead of using all this force against the Sadrists - fellow Iraqis and fellow Shi'ites - it would be wiser for Maliki to train his guns against the Americans.

The war between Maliki's troops and Muqtada's militiamen has led to the killing of nearly 300 people in Sadr City, Basra and Karbala. Maliki described the Sadrists - his former allies - as "ignorant", adding that they were "paid agents who corrupted all posts they had assumed". He added, "We spoke before about al-Qaeda, but there are among us those who are worst then al-Qaeda."

The Shi'ite divide
For many years now, the West has watched the world through the narrow parameter of Sunni vs Shi'ite. At one point from the 1970s onwards, it was Muslims vs Christians. Apparently today, the relationship stands as Shi'ite vs Shi'ite. The Muslim group can no longer be viewed as one big family - thanks to the preferences of Iran and the existence of people like Muqtada.

One year ago, the Iranians started to deal with the Sadrists in a more favorable manner. They were afraid that their traditional proxies in the Arab world, being Hezbollah and the Badr Brigade of the SIIC, were facing an uncertain future. Hezbollah was locked into a vicious feud within the Lebanese political system, and United Nations forces on the border prevented it from carrying out its traditional resistance role against the Israelis.

There was much speculation that Hezbollah might depart the scene - at least as an effective player - due to domestic restrictions, an upcoming war with Israel, or a new Lebanese civil war. On the other hand, the Badr Brigade was simply unable - despite all the money pouring into it from Tehran - to compete with the Sadrist network.

Muqtada had studied the Hezbollah model in Lebanon and created a system of charity and patronage among ordinary Shi'ites that made Hakim's men look like amateurs. He generously dished out money, sent personal gifts to Shi'ites in need, protected them from harm's way, sent them to school, and found jobs for all able young men.

Hakim too had money, plenty of it, but it was used to enrich himself and his limited circle of supporters, never the grassroots level (although commanders of the Badr Brigade are well paid). Muqtada became king in districts such as the southern city of Basra and Sadr City, imposing his version of Islam on everybody and everything, with much support from the local population.

He enforced Islamic dress code, banned the sale of alcohol, and banked on "Iraqism" rather than "Shi'itism". He trashed Badr for being "not Iraqi enough". He trumpeted how during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s they had fought with the Iranian army against fellow Iraqis, claiming they were more bonded by Shi'ite blood than Iraqi nationalism.

In as much as this annoyed the Iranians, they nevertheless had little means of keeping him quiet. Writing him off the political scene would be political suicide, since he was too powerful - and well protected - to be killed. Assassinating him would only make a martyr out of him. With him gone, and the Badr Brigade in uncertain waters, it was feared that their political and military arm in the Arab world would be amputated.

Hakim was recently diagnosed with cancer - making things all the more difficult - and his son Ammar would be unable to rule the SIIC after him, especially when challenged by somebody like Muqtada. Therefore, just like the Americans had reasoned before them, the Iranians decided to deal with Muqtada - although this might upset Hakim - with the aim of bringing him under their wing.
The Iranians began investing in the Mahdi Army - shyly at first - with the hope of creating either another Badr Brigade or another Hezbollah. As the situation intensified in Lebanon, they increased their efforts, supplying him with money, arms and orders. Muqtada froze activity of the Mahdi Army with the aim of revamping it and dismissing all undisciplined members.

One theory says that Imad Mughniya, the Hezbollah commander who was assassinated in Damascus in February, had been charged by Iran to restructure the Mahdi Army. He had been one of the architects of Hezbollah in 1982 and was asked to do the same to professionalize the Sadrists. While all of this was being done, Muqtada was asked to return to his religious studies so he could rise to the rank of ayatollah and therefore gain a much stronger role in Shi'ite domestics. He would then be authorized to issue religious decrees and answer religious questions related to politics - just like Hakim.

Then suddenly something went wrong, and last week Maliki (who is now equally close to the Iranians) went to war against the Sadrists. Some claim that an under-the-table deal was hammered out in Baghdad in March between the Americans, Maliki and Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad.

The Iranian leader would let the Americans have their way - and crush the Sadrists - in exchange for softening pressure on the Iranian regime. In return, Ahmadinejad would help them bring better security to Iraq through a variety of methods stemming from Iranian cooperation.

This would please the Americans, Maliki and the Iranians, who in exchange for Muqtada's head would enter a new relationship with the Americans. This might explain why the only people who have been lobbying heavily with Maliki - to stop the war on Muqtada - have been those opposed to Iranian meddling in Iraqi affairs, mainly Sunni tribes, ex-prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari (who refused sanctuary in Tehran during the Iran-Iraq war) and the Sunni speaker of parliament, Mahmud Mashadani.

Other Shi'ite heavyweights in the Arab world, like Hasan Nasrallah of Hezbollah and Lebanese parliament speaker Nabih Berri, who are both very close to Iran, have been relatively silent over the ordeal. Syria, which is a traditional friend of Iran and has good relations with Muqtada, has also refused to comment. Are all Shi'ites two sides of the same coin, or has this long-held belief been shattered by the war - and mutiny - in Basra?

Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.

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April 4, 2008
More Than 1,000 in Iraq's Forces Quit Basra Fight
By STEPHEN FARRELL and JAMES GLANZ
http://www.nytimes. com/2008/ 04/04/world/ middleeast/ 04iraq.html? hp

BAGHDAD — More than 1,000 Iraqi soldiers and policemen either
refused to fight or simply abandoned their posts during the
inconclusive assault against Shiite militias in Basra last week, a
senior Iraqi government official said Thursday. Iraqi military
officials said the group included dozens of officers, including at
least two senior field commanders in the battle.

The desertions in the heat of a major battle cast fresh doubt on the
effectiveness of the American-trained Iraqi security forces. The
White House has conditioned further withdrawals of American troops
on the readiness of the Iraqi military and police.

The crisis created by the desertions and other problems with the
Basra operation was serious enough that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-
Maliki hastily began funneling some 10,000 recruits from local
Shiite tribes into his armed forces. That move has already generated
anger among Sunni tribesmen whom Mr. Maliki has been much less eager
to recruit despite their cooperation with the government in its
fight against Sunni insurgents and criminal gangs.

A British military official said that Mr. Maliki had brought 6,600
reinforcements to Basra to join the 30,000 security personnel
already stationed there, and a senior American military official
said that he understood that 1,000 to 1,500 Iraqi forces had
deserted or underperformed. That would represent a little over 4
percent of the total.

A new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq cites significant
security improvements but concludes that security remains fragile,
several American government officials said.

Even as officials described problems with the planning and
performance of the Iraqi forces during the Basra operation, signs
emerged Wednesday that tensions with Moktada al-Sadr, the radical
cleric who leads the Mahdi Army militia, could flare up again. Mr.
Sadr, who asked his followers to stop fighting on Sunday, called
Thursday for a million Iraqis to march to the Shiite holy city of
Najaf next week to protest what he called the American occupation.
He also issued a veiled threat against Mr. Maliki's forces, whom he
accused of violating the terms of an agreement with the Iraqi
government to stand down.

Estimates by Iraqi military officials of the number of officers who
refused to fight during the Basra operation varied from several
dozen to more than 100. But three officials said that among those
who had been relieved of duty for refusing to fight were Col. Rahim
Jabbar and Lt. Col. Shakir Khalaf, the commander and deputy
commander of an entire brigade affiliated with the Interior Ministry.

A senior military official in Basra asserted that some members of
Colonel Khalaf's unit fought even though he did not. Asked why he
believed Colonel Khalaf did not fight, the official said that the
colonel did not believe the Iraqi security forces would be able to
protect him against threats to his life that he had received for his
involvement in the assault.

"If he fights today, he might be killed later," the official said.

The senior American military official said the number of officers
was "less than a couple dozen at most," but conceded that the figure
could rise as the performance of senior officers was assessed.

But most of the deserters were not officers. The American military
official said, "From what we understand, the bulk of these were from
fairly fresh troops who had only just gotten out of basic training
and were probably pushed into the fight too soon."

"There were obviously others who elected to not fight their fellow
Shia," the official said, but added that the coalition did not see
the failures as a "major issue," especially if the Iraqi government
dealt firmly with them.

Mr. Maliki, who personally directed the Basra operation, which both
American and Iraqi officials have criticized as poorly planned and
executed, acknowledged the desertions without giving a specific
number in public statements on Thursday.

"Everyone who was not on the side of the security forces will go
into the military courts," Mr. Maliki said in a news briefing in the
Green Zone. "Joining the army or police is not a trip or a picnic,
there is something that they have to pay back to commit to the
interests of the state and not the party or the sect."

"They swore on the Koran that they would not support their sect or
their party, but they were lying," he said.

On Sunday, Mr. Sadr gave the prime minister a somewhat face-saving
way out of the Basra fight by ordering the Mahdi fighters to lay
down their weapons after days in which government forces had made no
headway.

Mr. Sadr simultaneously made a series of demands, which senior Iraqi
politicians involved in the talks said they believed that Mr. Maliki
had agreed to in advance. But the prime minister has since denied
any involvement in the talks, and government raids on Mahdi Army
units — something Mr. Sadr had said must stop — have if anything
become more frequent in Basra and Baghdad.

Accordingly, Mr. Sadr's latest statement began by quoting a section
of the Koran promising doom to those who make promises and then
break them. He then complained bitterly that his followers were
being unjustly suppressed and arrested, and warned that nothing
would force them to completely withdraw. But he did not explicitly
call for new fighting.

American support for Iraqi government forces has also continued, and
on Thursday the American military said it had carried out two
airstrikes on Wednesday in Basra, one "to destroy an enemy structure
housing a sniper engaging Iraqi security forces in Basra" and
another to destroy a machine gun nest.

The Iraqi police said one of the strikes leveled a two-story house
in Basra's Kibla neighborhood, killing three people and wounding
three, all in the same family. The police made no mention of hostile
activity.

Ryan C. Crocker, the United States ambassador to Iraq, said Mr.
Maliki took the lead in talks with Shiite tribes and said that the
turnout of thousands of security applicants in Basra was testament
to his success.

"It is very clear that they have moved over toward the prime
minister in a very significant way," Mr. Crocker said during a
briefing in the United States Embassy in Baghdad.

"The tribal element he managed himself, as far as I can see," he
said. "You may recall he had a series of meetings with different
tribal leaders, three or four of them, maybe more. That was
something he focused on almost from the beginning, and pressed it
hard straight through and has seen it pay off. Did he have counsel
to do it, I don't know. But he is the one who did it."

Two southern tribal sheiks said that by providing recruits for the
security forces, they were expressing support for the government.
But the sheiks made clear that the promise of good-paying jobs for
the largely unemployed young men in their tribes had also been a
powerful inducement.

Sheik Kamal al-Helfi, head of the Basra branch of the Halaf tribe,
said by phone that he was still bargaining to increase his tribe's
allotment of 25 jobs in the security forces. "Many people faced a
bad situation since the time of Saddam, and they have no jobs," he
said.

Another southern tribal leader, Sheik Adel al-Subihawi, said larger
and more powerful tribes had received quotas as high as 300 jobs.

Mr. Maliki also announced $100 million in economic assistance to
Basra, to be administered by the central government in partnership
with the provincial government, and said the government would create
25,000 jobs in the city over the coming year.

Citing that promise of assistance and the tribal discussions, Mr.
Crocker said, "Were there deals? Like everything else, that is not
an engagement you win purely by military means. The prime minister
is employing the economic dimension of power right now, and good on
him, I think. Money is in many respects his most important weapon
and he is using it."

Mr. Maliki said that the tribal recruits would be carefully vetted.
But that was not enough to satisfy some Sunnis farther north who
have been waiting for months to see comparable numbers of their
tribesmen accepted into the government security forces. Tens of
thousands of these Sunnis, including many former insurgents, are
working alongside Iraqi and American troops in a so-called tribal
awakening movement — clearly a model for the tribal outreach in
Basra.

"Recruiting large number of young people in Basra to fight the JAM
proves once again that the government of Nuri al-Maliki is a
sectarian government, a double-standard one that favors one sect at
the expense of other sects," said Abu Othman, a senior member of
Fadhil Awakening Council, referring to the Mahdi Army by its Arabic
acronym.

Abu Othman said four months ago he had presented 100 Sunni names for
enrollment in the Iraqi police and had received no reply.

"The Maliki government wants security forces that are controlled,
manipulated and moved by them," he said.

Reporting was contributed by Michael Gordon, Qais Mizher, Ahmad
Fadam and Karim al-Hilmi from Baghdad, and Iraqi employees of The
New York Times from Basra.

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Basra Assault Exposed U.S., Iraqi Limits
Anti-Sadr Gambit Seen Aiding Cleric
By Sudarsan Raghavan and Ernesto Londoño
Washington Post Foreign Service
Friday, April 4, 2008; A01
http://www.washingt onpost.com/ wp-dyn/content/ article/2008/ 04/03/AR20080403 00309_pf. html

BAGHDAD, April 3 -- When Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki launched an offensive in Basra last week, he consulted only his inner circle of advisers. There were no debates in parliament or among his political allies. Senior American officials were notified only a few days before the operation began.

He was determined to show, his advisers said, that Iraq's central government could exert order over a lawless, strategic port city ruled by extremist militias. The advisers said Maliki wanted to demonstrate that he was a strong leader who could shed his reputation as a sectarian figure by going after fellow Shiites, and who could act decisively without U.S. pressure or assistance.

A week later, his ultimately unsuccessful gambit has exposed the shaky foundation upon which U.S. policy in Iraq rests after five years of war, according to politicians and analysts. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top military commander in Iraq, and U.S. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker are to report to Congress next week on Iraq's progress.

The offensive, which triggered clashes across southern Iraq and in Baghdad that left about 600 people dead, unveiled the weaknesses of Maliki's U.S.-backed government and his brash style of leadership. On many levels, the offensive strengthened the anti-American Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

The United States has spent more than $22 billion to build up Iraq's security forces, but they were unable to quell the militias. Hundreds of Iraqi soldiers and police deserted the fighting, a senior Iraqi military official said. Maliki had to call on U.S. and British commanders for support. In some areas, such as Sadr's Baghdad stronghold of Sadr City, U.S. forces took the lead in fighting the cleric's Mahdi Army militiamen.

And it was Iran that helped broker an end to the clashes, enhancing its image and illustrating its influence over Iraq's political players.

"It was ill-advised and ill-timed," said Kurdish lawmaker Mahmoud Othman. "I think Maliki had a setback and America had a setback because Iran and Moqtada al-Sadr were victorious."

But other Iraqi politicians, including many who are wary of Sadr's growing influence or consider Maliki too pro-Shiite, said they admired the prime minister's decisiveness and courage. "For the first time, I felt that Maliki is now stronger than he was in the last two years," said Hussein Shuku Falluji, a legislator with the largest Sunni bloc in parliament.

Senior American officials put a positive face on the offensive and its aftermath. Crocker, in a briefing Thursday with journalists, said the Basra violence was not a setback for the United States in Iraq and did not "erase the significant progress" in improving security in recent months. "This is a positive development for Iraq," he said, adding that Maliki had emerged stronger.

But Crocker also acknowledged the tenuousness of recent reductions in violence more than a year after the launch of a temporary buildup of American troops. "Gains are fragile," he said. "This episode demonstrates it."

Tensions persisted between Maliki and Sadr this week. Maliki vowed to continue to go after Shiite militias in Baghdad. And Sadr called on Iraqis to join what he said would be a million-person rally against the U.S. occupation, set for Wednesday, the fifth anniversary of American troops toppling Saddam Hussein's government.

The Basra offensive put on display the growing tensions between Sadr and his main Shiite rivals -- Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and Maliki's Dawa party. Sadr's support propelled Maliki into his current post two years ago. But under heavy U.S. pressure, Maliki began to turn against Sadr, and last summer, the Sadrists pulled out of Maliki's ruling coalition.

By distancing himself from Maliki's government, which is widely seen as sectarian, inefficient and corrupt, Sadr apparently hopes to bolster his credentials as an Iraqi nationalist.

Last August, following clashes between Mahdi Army and Iraqi forces in the Shiite holy city of Karbala, Sadr imposed a unilateral cease-fire, largely to improve his movement's image and rebuild his militia into a disciplined force. Many observers see the cease-fire as a key reason for the recent drop in violence.

But Iraqi security forces, whose leaders are widely believed to be members of the Supreme Council and, less so, Dawa, have been detaining hundreds of Sadr's followers, prompting allegations of torture and other abuses.

Senior Sadr leaders have said their rivals have taken advantage of the cease-fire to weaken Sadr's movement ahead of provincial elections expected this year.

In interviews, senior advisers to Maliki and Hakim insisted that the Basra offensive was intended to combat criminal gangs and oil smugglers. Jalal al-Din al-Saghir, a senior Supreme Council official, said the government had not targeted Sadr.

"The forces which Maliki sent to Basra were not the type or size needed for city fighting, to confront Sadr," Saghir said.

Other lawmakers said Maliki had to know the offensive would be seen as a political maneuver. "He wanted to create a victory for himself," Othman said. "Maybe the Americans encouraged him."

Shiite lawmaker Basem Sharif, a member of the Fadhila Party, which has strong support in Basra, said he does not question the government's authority to pursue outlaws. But he said Maliki failed to shore up support in parliament before sending troops into Basra.

"Every big military operation should be based on a political base so the military operation will succeed," Sharif said.

Crocker himself was informed four days before the offensive began and received an impression of the operation's scope that differed from what transpired.

"I had the understanding this was going to be an effort to kind of get down, show they were serious with additional forces, put the squeeze on, develop a full picture of conditions and then act accordingly, " Crocker said. "I was not expecting, frankly, a major battle from Day One. But then again it's not clear to me that they'd decided that's what they were going to do. The enemy has a vote in combat."

Sadiq al-Rikabi, a top political adviser to Maliki, defended the prime minister's handling of the Basra operation, while acknowledging that it "did not work as well" as expected.

"The plan of Basra is not new," Rikabi said, adding that the government had even set up a headquarters in Basra to prepare for the strike. "He's been working on it for more than six months."

Rikabi said Maliki decided to launch the offensive on March 25 after learning that the security situation in the city was deteriorating quickly. He said physicians in the city had gone on strike because two of their colleagues had been killed and scores of people were being killed daily. Rikabi said the prime minister consulted his security advisers, his ministerial security committee and U.S. military commanders before dispatching troops. He rejected the criticism that the operation had political goals, saying the objective was to apprehend specific outlaws.

A senior official in Iraq's Defense Ministry, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not allowed to discuss military operations publicly, said Iraqi troops were overwhelmed by the second day of fighting.

"I was afraid the Iraqi forces would break," he said.

The official said he estimated that 30 percent of the Iraqi troops abandoned the fight before a cease-fire was reached. He also said that soldiers had been hindered by ammunition and food shortages and that some Iraqi police troops, who were supposed to be backing the Iraqi army, had actually supported the militias.

The official said the militias had 12,000 to 15,000 fighters -- roughly the same number as Iraqi troops. But being in their home territory gave the militias an advantage, he said.

As the fighting progressed, the official said, the militias received weapons from Iran, including mortars and other large weapons, a charge Iranian officials have persistently denied. The Iraqi army, meanwhile, received crucial air support from U.S. and British forces. "If the British and American forces were not there, the Mahdi Army would have gained a victory," he said.

On March 30, Sadr issued a statement, negotiated in the Iranian city of Qom, ordering his fighters to lay down their arms, provided the Iraqi government stopped conducting raids and detaining his followers and provided amnesty to his fighters. By the next day, attacks had dramatically subsided.

"It showed that the majority of Moqtada's followers obeyed his orders," said Sharif, the Shiite lawmaker from the Fadhila Party. "Maybe it's a message to the Iraqi government and the Americans that [Sadr] is able to control Iraq and turn it from a bad state to a good state" overnight, he said.

Many Sunni politicians applauded Maliki for going after Shiite militias after months of targeting mostly Sunni insurgents. Many Sunnis now view Iran as a greater enemy than the United States.

"What is behind those militias is the Iranian influence," said Falluji, the Sunni lawmaker. "So [Maliki's] willingness to comfort these groups and to try and end the state of chaos which Iran wants to sow in Iraqi society has made him stronger."

But Falluji was concerned that Sadr had met with Maliki's advisers in Iran. "The events in Basra have shown the weakness of the American role in Iraq and the strength of Iranian influence in Iraq," he said.

Special correspondents K.I. Ibrahim and Naseer Nouri contributed to this report.

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In backing the Basra assault, the US has only helped Sadr
The tacit promotion of Shia civil war has left the militias stronger and fuelled scepticism about the much-hyped surge
Jonathan Steele The Guardian, Friday April 4 2008
http://www.guardian .co.uk/commentis free/2008/ apr/04/usa. iraq

The battle for Basra, which came to a halt on Sunday, was a disaster for everyone except its intended losers. Tens of thousands of families were trapped in their homes for a week, their electricity, mobile phones and water cut off. The number of deaths is unknown, but is probably several hundred.

Iraq's prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki - who ordered the assault and put his prestige on the line by supervising it in person - has emerged with his authority severely weakened. His army and police took a battering and failed to capture any ground, with several commanders and units going over to the Sadrist militias they were meant to be defeating. And the Bush administration' s effort to portray Iraq as a place that is gradually calming down thanks to the "surge" of an extra 30,000 US troops looks far less convincing to an increasingly sceptical US public.

Finally, there is the blow to Britain's remaining forces stuck at Basra airport. Some 1,600 had been hoping to leave Iraq this spring. Des Browne's Commons statement this week shows that a few of them played a bigger role in the Basra fighting than was at first realised. As well as mounting surveillance and artillery strikes, British troops were deployed to rescue Iraqi units from militia counterattacks. Now the government feels it has to show solidarity with Maliki and Bush by delaying another troop reduction, even though only a limited number were needed last week. British forces are held hostage to save the face of politicians once again.

Meanwhile, Moqtada al-Sadr, the target of the assault, comes out of the crisis strengthened. His militiamen gave no ground and, by declaring a ceasefire that has successfully held since Sunday, Sadr has demonstrated his authority and the discipline of his men. Their tactics are often brutal and some of his commanders little more than thugs or warlords, but they obey their political boss.

Big questions remain over the backroom negotiations that ended the fighting. In his ceasefire announcement Sadr called for an end to the Maliki government's campaign of arresting local Sadr representatives in Baghdad and other cities. This has been going on for months without a Sadr response. Sadr also asked for the release of those being held, an estimated two thousand. What is not clear is whether the government conceded these points during pre-ceasefire talks. If so, then Sadr's appeal was a generous cover to allow the government not to look as though it had already capitulated. Much will depend on whether Maliki fulfils the promises he made. Otherwise fighting may resume, this time with Sadr taking the initiative.

The US role is the other main unknown. General David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq, and the Bush administration' s civilian officials supported the arrests of Sadr's people. They have long worked with Maliki and Sadr's main political rivals, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (formerly the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), to weaken the movement. Although the fighting in Basra was led by the Iraqi national army, many of its units are made up of troops of Isci's fighting wing, the Badr organisation.

President Bush described last week's fighting as a "positive moment in the development of a sovereign nation that is willing to take on elements that believe they are beyond the law". In reality, it amounted to US support for the promotion of a Shia civil war. There are depressing similarities with US policy in Palestine, where the US is arming and financing Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah movement against Hamas instead of working for Palestinian unity.

US officials say that Iran is behind the Sadr movement, a charge that could equally be made about Isci, whose leaders spent decades exiled in Tehran during the Saddam Hussein years. In fact, Sadr's real sin in Washington's eyes is that, of all the Shia movements, his is the one that has most consistently opposed the US occupation and called for a timetable for US troops to leave Iraq.

How far was the US responsible for last week's assault? When Iraqi government forces became bogged down after the initial attacks, US officials were quick to brief American journalists that they had not been fully consulted in advance. Certainly the government's poor performance and the flare-up in fighting have made things harder for Petraeus and the US ambassador, Ryan Crocker, when they brief Congress next week on the latest results of the surge. But it is hard to believe that the Iraqi army could have undertaken such a major offensive without American cooperation, since they needed American, and British, surveillance and air support.

The most likely explanation is that the Americans approved the assault, confidently expecting it would succeed within a few days. The hardline US vice-president, Dick Cheney, was in Baghdad two weeks earlier and may well have urged Maliki to go ahead. They hoped for a triumph to boast about in Congress. Now they must explain a disaster.

Even before the Basra assault, scepticism about the surge was mounting in the US. A majority of the American public wants a timetable for a US withdrawal, and the two Democratic contenders are still firm on the point, arguing that the surge has not resolved Iraq's underlying problems. Senators Obama and Clinton are vague on some key issues, not least their intention to keep "residual forces" in or around Iraq even if most combat troops leave. But they have not been taken in by the surge.

Deploying an extra 30,000 troops was not the main factor in lessening sectarian attacks - the measure used to define the surge's success. More significant was the uprising by Iraqi Sunnis against al-Qaida, which has put foreign jihadis on the defensive and made it harder for them to attack Shias. The ceasefire announced by Sadr last August had a major effect in reducing revenge attacks by his followers on Sunni civilians.

That is why last week's assault on Basra was particularly foolish. Instead of using Sadr's original ceasefire constructively to engage him in political dialogue, American officials joined Maliki in trying to break Sadr's movement. The lesson of the past few days must be that this policy is doomed. Sadr is a major player who cannot be marginalised or defeated. He has widespread popular support, not just because of his socially conservative Islamist message, but because of his nationalist credentials. These have been strengthened by last week's failed assault. It should not be repeated.

j.steele@guardian. co.uk